Abstract:
This paper seeks to develop the principle concerns of the state-corporate crime literature by drawing connections between two incidents that occurred 15 months apart: the sinking of the oil tanker the Prestige in Galicia in November 2002 and the killing of 24 Chinese migrant workers at Morecambe Bay in the North West of England in February 2004. It begins by introducing the key features of the two cases, before exploring how they might be described and understood as state-corporate crimes. It then identifies a tendency within the literature to analyse state-corporate crimes as 'moments of rupture' in the regulatory relationship. Seeking to move beyond such 'moments of rupture, the paper argues for an understanding of regulatory relationships as part of a broader regime of permission that seek the smooth and uninterrupted accumulation of capital. It thus identifies the 'process' that must be analysed as a process of capital accumulation. This process is illustrated by focussing on the spheres of production and distribution in this story of capital accumulation. In the course of describing the complex 'regime of permission', the paper uncovers a structure of impunity that generally enables the most powerful architects and beneficiaries of state-corporate crime. Rather than seeing this as an epiphenomenon, or a consequence of bias in criminal justice systems, the paper will argue that the basis for impunity is a constituent part of into the system of accumulation.
Response to Reviewers:
We have responded to the reviewer's comments by first strengthening the way we present our argument in order to make it clear that the paper uses the State Corporate crime literature as a foundation, and the work of Tombs and Lasslett as its point of departure to extend/deepen the S-C Crime critique. We have also clarified further how we conceptualise 'moments of rupture' and have sharpened our reflections on the literature in order to show more clearly how the S-CC scholarship might be strengthened. The changes we have made in order to accomplish those aims are set out in detail below.
1) A re-written final section in the first para of the introduction sets out more precisely how the S-CC literature locates the production of crime in the structures of capitalism and points to literature on 'empire crime'.
2) New material is introduced after the sub-heading From Regulatory Pathology to the Regime of Permission (para 3 and first half of para 4, and opening sentences in paras 7 and 9 of this section), which makes more clear the (subtle) difference in our analysis (how we need to view a broader system of production and entirety of social relations that enable criminal and harmful practices to occur) vis-à-vis theirs (that normal political economy of hydrocarbon production produces deviant outcomes) and the structure of this section is re-oganised to reflect this 3) New material is introduced to the conclusion to clarify this perspective. Here we argue: "In neither case were the formative conditions of the criminogenic 'event' found in particular decisions and actions or non-decisions and inactions of state or government institutions. There were elements we could describe as state initiated or state facilitated, but those conditions don't fully describe the state-corporate crimes here. The circumstances that led to the Prestige and Morecambe bay disasters can only be partially explained using a concept of state-corporate crime. The corporate crimes we describe here emanate from an architecture of power in which states guarantee corporations various privileges and infrastructural capacities." In order to accommodate this, we have deleted the section on structures of impunity which gets in the way of the core argument.
We have also thoroughly proof-read the article dealt with the typographical and the presentation issues.
Many thanks again for the time you have taken to respond with a very detailed level of engagement.
Introduction
Studies in state-corporate crime, organised around a growing and relatively new agenda in corporate crime research, take the on-going and often symbiotic relationship between state/public actors and private actors (normally large corporations) as the point of departure for its analysis (Kramer et. al., 2002 ). There are three major challenges to criminology that this approach implies. First, by developing an analysis of power relations beyond the immediate circumstances of a particular moment, fixed in time,
with very particular circumstances, it takes us beyond a paralysing fixation that mainstream criminology has with criminal 'events', a fixation that is of limited value because it does not allow us to view the conditions that produced those crimes as rooted in more on-going and ever-present social conditions of unequal power (Pearce, 1976) .
The state-corporate crime literature thus points consistently to a structure of political economy which creates the particular conditions that shape the relationship between states and corporations (Kramer et. al., 2002; Kramer and Michalowski, 2006) . In this sense, the literature seeks to develop an understanding of the social content of the relationship between states and corporations in modern liberal democracies. A similar critical observation is made consistently in feminist analyses of male violence; which is conceived of as a form of violence that can only be understood as part of an on-going state of gendered power relations (Walklate, 2003: 127-129) . Second, moving from event to process poses a difficulty for more statist or administrative criminological approaches, since it shifts the terrain on which we search for who might be held 'criminally' responsible. Third, this literature locates the production of crime in the structures of capitalism, not least in the drive for accumulation that shapes the relationship between states and corporations (the motivations for crimes the lack of control and regulatory structures and the relative impunity granted to corporate actors).
The literature that points to 'empire crime' is particularly illuminating in this respect, highlighting as it does, the deep historical origins of state-corporate collusion (for example, Iadicola, 2010 and 2011 see also, Kauzlarich and Matthews, 2006 .
We develop the latter point later in this paper, and argue that understanding statecorporate crime as part of a historically configured process of capital accumulation impels us to look beyond the actors and social relationships that are immediately visible in the circumstances of the 'crime' or 'event'.
The importance of understanding of state corporate crime as an historically and socially situated process is illustrated by our analysis of the sinking of the Prestige oil tanker in . As we uncover the historically and socially situated immediate conditions of those cases, we argue that the Prestige disaster to some extent accounts for the conditions that produced the Morecambe Bay disaster. We explain how we come to this conclusion in the discussion below, before returning to uncover the historical and broader social content of those 'events'.
From Galicia to Morecambe Bay: connecting two criminogenic 'events'
The sinking of the Prestige oil tanker in November 2002 created a spill that polluted thousands of kilometres of coastline and in terms of the ecological and economic damage suffered in the aftermath, was certainly the worst oil spill in Spain's history and perhaps the worst in Europe's history. The immediate crisis was immeasurably worsened by the Spanish government's order to tow the vessel out to sea, away from Spanish waters, despite warnings that the ship would not be able to withstand the storm conditions forecast for the area (Naucher, 2013) . In trying to remove the threat of both the environmental and political fall out from the spill, the Spanish government caused a further major rupture in the vessel and turned a manageable spill into the disaster of unmanageable proportions. Had it followed its own protocols set out in the Spanish National Emergency Plan, it would have towed the vessel into the port to deal with the spill (Greenpeace, 2012) . Ángel del Real, Maritime Captain of the port of La Coruña gave the order to tow the vessel 160 km from the coast escorted by the Spanish Navy.
The decision was approved by the Minister for Development, and later by the Prime Minister José María Aznar. The ship owners and the company of the rescue opposed the decision to tow the vessel away from the coast. Moreover, it seems that the decision to change the direction of the vessel was also taken partly due to pressure from the French government (Catalán Deus, 2003; 82) .
Measured in terms of the impact on biodiversity and the environment, the collective cost of the catastrophe was huge. The 'black tide' was certainly the biggest ecological disaster to hit the Spanish coast, and was possibly the most damaging oil spill in European history. More than 2,000 km of coast were affected. Shellfish, particularly mussels, were badly affected, as were other staple seafoods. Ornithology estimated the number of sea birds deaths caused by the oil at between 115,000 and 230,000, one of the highest sea bird mortalities by non-natural causes ever seen (Ecologistas en Acción, 2012). These are aspect of the consequences of the disaster, related to the loss of biodiversity, are difficult to translate into monetary terms (Prada et. al. 2002) . At the same time, the cleaning and the restoration are collective costs that are measurable in monetary terms. The cost of the post-disaster clean-up was estimated at around 107 million euros. 1 The most affected people were relatively low paid workers in the fishing and seafood industry. The impact on those sectors can be calculated in monetary terms according to the transformations in quantity and quality of the goods and services offered in the market (Varela et. al. 2002: 139) . In 2003, the value of fishing and tourism lost totalled around 1.4 billion euros (ibid.: 148). This disaster is aggravated due to Galicia's status as one of the poorest areas in Spain together with its dependence on natural marine resources (Surís & Garza, 2003: 317) .
The circumstances of this tragedy seem rather distant from the Morecambe Bay disaster. (Kramer and Michalowski, 2006: 20) . It is this focus on the "mutually reinforcing interaction" between state and corporation that is the point of departure for our discussion in the following section.
Beyond State-Corporate Antagonism
Generally, when we analyse such crises of regulation, we impelled to look for a breakdown in the relationship between two, potentially antagonistic, parties (the state and the corporation). Yet, as the literature on state-corporate crime illustrates clearly, often there no clear antagonism or opposition of interest in those relationships, since those crimes often occur as a result of commonly shared or mutual goals (Kramer, 1992; Aulette and Michalowski, 1993; Kramer et al. 2002) .
The state-corporate crime framework advances this approach by identifying two types of institutional relationships: those that are state-facilitated and those that state-initiated Bruce and Becker, 2007) . It is this duality that the literature uses to explore the full complexity of state involvement in, and contribution to, the circumstances that lead to corporate crimes. In the former case, state-corporate crimes are the result of negligence or inactivity on the part of the states or their regulatory agencies in ways that collusively facilitate corporations in the commission of statecorporate crime. Thus, the state fails to provide the necessary mechanism to effectively balance or control the corporate activity. Often, a concept of "nested contexts" is introduced to show there is always a political economy that shapes the conditions for state-corporate facilitated crime, particularly when failure of regulation are discussed (Kramer, 1992; Aulette and Michalowski, 1993; Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2000; Cruciotti and Matthews, 2006) . In the case of the latter -state initiated crime -state institutions pursue pro-active strategies that play a leading role in the commission of state-corporate crimes. Here, the state not only fails to regulate the private sector, but it has a paramount role in fostering the criminal activity that benefits corporations (see, for example, Rothe, 2006; Whyte, 2007) .
At the global level, international financial institutions such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund can play the same role as public institutions or nationstates in facilitating or initiating corporate crimes (Friedrichs and Friedrichs, 2002; Wonders and Danner, 2006) . A variation in the literature points to corporate-facilitated and corporate-initiated state crimes, a modification which foregrounds the agency of the corporation and the primary casual nature of capital accumulation in state-corporate crimes (Matthews, 2006; Whyte, 2009; Lasslett, 2014) .
The state-corporate crime approach has been subject to some critique on the basis that it does not go far enough in revealing the social content of state corporate crimes. As Tombs (2012) has argued, for example, the state-corporate crime literature retains a tendency to focus upon the immediate circumstances of: discrete joint ventures between corporations and states, either at specific moments or towards specific ends, thus abstracting these from a more generalized set of social relationships, which are on-going, enduring and more akin, in fact, to a process.
Similarly, Lasslett (2010: 212) has noted that this literature is characterised by its inability to concretise state-corporate crimes as part of a broader system of production and "orient the researcher to less evident, but extremely important social realities that inform the crimes of the powerful."
We would agree with both Tombs and Lasslett. The description of our cases above provides the basis for launching an exploration of state-corporate crimes as events that are produced as part both of a more generalized set of social broader system of economic production. We say this because the most apparent link across those cases seems to be that they are "crimes of the economy" (Ruggiero, 2013) in the sense that their circumstances are rooted in a classical political economy understanding of the human consequences of shifts in the forces of supply and demand that are shaped and co-ordinated in a global economy. The abstraction that both Tombs (2012) 
From Regulatory Pathology to the Regime of Permission
The state-corporate crime literature has produced significant analyses of the subject of this paper: oil spills.
Bradshaw's discussion of the criminogenic structure of the industry represents a development of the conceptualisation of state-corporate crime by introducing the concept of 'industry' level to those of 'institutional', 'organizational' and 'interactional' levels that were firstly advanced by Kramer et al. (2002) . Thus, the article points to the competition between business organizations that lead to more "criminogenic industry (Whyte, 2014) .
In this sense, we are arguing that state-corporate crime should not be pathologised.
That is to say that state-corporate crimes are not necessarily accurately described as "wrongful interactions" because they are not necessarily deviations from a normal social path or social state in which a 'better' relationship between government and corporation can guarantee protection from the process of capital accumulation. Rather, corporate crimes are better understood as interruptions or unplanned phenomena that arise from the normal conditions of doing business. As this article will argue, in order to fully understand the formative conditions of state-corporate crime, it is not enough to 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 look to regulatory pathologies; it is not enough to limit our analysis to the empirical conditions of regulatory 'collusion' and 'failure'.
How, then, could we think about the deeper architecture of corporate power in order to take us beyond the immediately observable conditions of those regulatory pathologies?
We approach corporate crime and its regulation as a distillation of a range of social relationships, institutions and practices that exist prior to the immediately observable conditions and relationships that produced the criminal event. In doing so, this shifts our focus away from the moment of rupture towards a concern with recovering the social content and the historical context of those immediately observable relationships.
We The corporation, in the sense that it is established formally, is permitted through its legal and political status to structure its activities in particular ways. Those include: its ability to trade as a separate entity; its ability to structure ownership in particular ways, its ability to attract investment through a range of incentives and so on. Those Tombs calls "a more generalized set of social relationships". In this sense, we are seeking to conceretise, following Lasslett, the "a broader system of production", which in capitalist social orders, is organised around a process of capital accumulation. In order to do so, we see the observable institutional relationship between 'state' and 'capital' as merely an epiphenomena of a broader regime of permission, and therefore an epiphenomena of how capital accumulation is more generally reproduced through regulatory structures. It is this understanding that can more fully illuminate the social content of corporate crimes. And it is to this task that the rest of the paper turns. 
The Regime of Permission from Galicia to Morecambe Bay
Here we specify the regulatory process -or the regime of permission -that enables capital accumulation to be reproduced. This is how we begin to discover the entirety of the social conditions that enable criminal and harmful practices to occur.
The broader regime of permission that we point to can be usefully delineated into four major spheres, the categories that Marx called the 'moments' of capital accumulation:
the spheres of production, distribution, exchange and consumption (Marx, 1993) . He argues that since production is the predominant sphere, the latter categories of distribution, exchange and consumption merely represent different stages or 'moments'
in the life of a product. However, the three other spheres also determine the form that production takes (ibid.). In this analysis we are largely concerned with the social content of the spheres of production and distribution because this is most clearly where we can observe the regime of permission in our cases. It is clear that there is a lot to be said about how the events that we describe here have impacted upon exchange and consumption, not least how the profound reshaping of seafood markets and the fluctuation of seafood prices in the wake of the Prestige undoubtedly had socially harmful effects (for example in the emergence of intensified demand, a decline in the quality of food products and so on). Whilst this is beyond the scope of this paper, we would therefore stress that there is much to be learned from a fuller analysis of the spheres of exchange and consumption as part of the totality of the regime of permission. Our priority here, however, is to see a little more clearly how both the Prestige and the Morecambe Bay disaster were made possible through a set of a priori social relationships that in each of those spheres of production and distribution are reproduced.
By doing so, we uncover a highly complex regime of permission, a core part of which materialises in each case as a structure of impunity. Though this analysis we can see precisely how the major players are the architects and key beneficiaries of each 'crime', but in its aftermath are permitted to continue as if nothing had happened.
Although our case is largely a case of oil distribution, we offer our first set of observations, on the sphere of oil production, as context for understanding the social content of our case.
Oil Production
The regulatory practices that govern the production of oil are based upon one overriding principle: the permission to continue the extraction of oil at the most profitable rate of production. The regulation of oil production is highly regulated in this sense by oil producing states. The US, as the major oil producing nation, controlled oil prices for the early half of the 20 th century, ceding its influence to the OPEC countries in the 1970s. The current global dip in the price of oil is a result of the weakening of this system of production controls in the OPEC oil producing countries and a re-shifting of the balance back to Western producers (Harvey 2010; Arrighi, 1999) .
The sphere of exchange comes to life here since the regulation of production in oil markets is concerned largely with price regulation. Of course, there are a complexity of   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 social and environmental regulatory structures that, for example, aim to mitigate spills and impose particular safety protections for workers. Those standards apply differently across jurisdictions. However, although they may impact on the conditions of production, those forms of regulation are not concerned with limiting the volume of production per se, but with minor adjustments to the way that oil is produced.
Environmental controls are also imposed after the production process: at the stage that the product is used. Thus, emissions controls on industry or on the use of road vehicles seek to limit use at the point of consumption. Thus, climate change treaties or international agreements that seek to mitigate the impact of the use of hydrocarbon fuels seek to limit carbon emissions. If there is a rudimentary system of regulation set out in agreements such as the Kyoto protocol, it is one that seeks to regulate the end point of the production cycle, rather than control the level of extraction per se. Whilst our very truncated and selective over-review of some key of dynamics in the regulation of oil production may not seem empirically relevant to what follows (and the origin of the heavy fuel being transported by the Prestige is not known) we have in this section identified a core principle of regulation: a clear regime of permission principle at work, in which the potential harms of hydrocarbon production are subordinated to the production process itself. This is the broader regime of permission that frames our discussion here: one that sets the coordinates for understanding the principle on which the distribution of oil proceeds.
Oil Distribution
The regime of permission that is significant in the distribution of oil by sea is notoriously complex and fragmented. Each nation state has its own regulatory structure 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 for merchant shipping. At the same time, there is an international treaty structure and a number of international organisations responsible for regulation. A UN organisation, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) is responsible for developing and maintaining safety, environmental protection, and security issues relating to shipping.
IMO regulations on the transportation of oil cover a range of issues including the technical specifications applying to ballast and stability, the location of oil storage on ships, the hull structure (single hull tankers are being phased out as a result of IMO double hull regulations), and the rules for assessing risk and reporting requirements. In 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 cargo who set it on course for Gibraltar where it was to wait for new instructions.
Crown Resources itself was owned by a holding company based in Luxemburg, which It took 14 years before a judgment in the Spanish Supreme Court in January ruled that Mare Shipping, along with the ship's insurer were jointly liable for the spill (Spain.
Supreme Court 11/2016). It remains to be seen if there will be any action to recover the damages. However, even if damages were sought, because they are owners of 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 incorporated businesses it is highly unlikely that the individual owners of those companies will be asked to pay full costs of the disaster. noted above. The court delivered its sentence one year later, eleven years after the disaster. The captain had been found guilty in an earlier case and sentenced to two years in prison (serving nine months of the sentence). Only the captain was found guilty of crimes against the environment. López Sors, the only representative of the Spanish government to be indicted was acquitted, even though the government's negligence was clear: a Governing Committee was never constituted, no qualified personnel were sent to the ship, and the ship was knowingly sent into a storm and then ordered to change the direction several times, making a spill inevitable. Thus, the judgement against the captain effectively absolved both the government its responsibility for managing the crisis along with the owners of the oil and the vessel (Naucher, 2013 ).
What we have described here is a series of complex regulatory mechanisms that originate in the process of capital accumulation, and in the way that a particular form of property ownership (the corporation) is reproduced in regulations that are universally applied across capitalist states. Those mechanisms have reproduced a structure of impunity that enabled both the owners of the vessel and the oil to escape liability for the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 disaster. A crucial aspect of regimes of permission, is, in other words, revealed clearly here as a complex structure of impunity.
This structure of impunity extended to the US regulator. In a failed attempt to obtain compensation for the disaster (El País, 9th June, 2008), the Spanish government, instead of pursuing Mares Shipping or the Alpha Group, which would have proved difficult for reasons set out in the preceding discussion, attempted to prosecute the regulator that permitted the Prestige to operate, the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). In this case, the US courts ruled that Spain could not prove that the actions of ABS constituted a cause of the wreck of the Prestige. Spain made several arguments in the case. For the purposes of our paper, three of those arguments are significant. The first related to the failure to ensure compliance of standards relating to the inspection of condition of the vessel. After the Erika disaster off the coast of France in 1999, the ABS proposed that major classification organisations must adopt a number of measures, including classifying old tanks, organising annual inspections, and the mandatory use of the SafeHull program. ABS had been accused of failing to act on knowledge of structural damage to the hull of the Prestige that it had possessed since 1996 (ibid.; Reino de España v. American Bureau of Shipping). The court found that although the regulations were not followed in the case of the Prestige, they were not mandatory at the moment of the wreck and thus ABS was not liable.
The Prestige was inspected but remarkably, the results of the Marine Services inspection were not reported because the Crown Resources did not pay the fee that was due for the full inspection program. This is remarkable, because the condition of the vessel was hidden simply because the Prestige's charterer had refused to pay a statutory 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 fee. Because of this and ABS's failure to share the information of the previous tests with local surveyors, Spain alleged that ABS was reckless. Spain additionally suggested that ABS was reckless as the Prestige's then Captain Kostazos sent a fax to Marine Services in August 2002 alerting the regulator of the serious condition of the Prestige and asking for an emergency inspection. According to the American court that since ABS was a parent company, then it could not be held liable for the knowledge held by its subsidiary company. Spain could not prove that Marine Service ever informed ABS, or that ABS was aware of the issue; or even that the fax arrived to its destination. Thus, the court dismissed the Spanish petition and decided that ABS had no legal responsibility for the condition of the Prestige (Reino de España v. American
Bureau of Shipping). The latter finding is particularly instructive, since we can discern a principle of outsourcing within the administration of the US regulatory system (Hansen, 2008) . It is this principle of outsourcing that enabled the regulator -as well as the owners of the vessel and the oil to escape liability! In sum, this structure of impunity ultimately ensured the status quo: the commercial strength of the corporate owners of the oil was maintained; the system of shipping regulation and of oil distribution remained unchallenged; and crucially, the pattern of ownership was undisrupted. Those different forms of impunity, drawing upon a myriad of different legal structures and different institutional forms converge as part of the general regime of permission.
Seafood Production

22
The production of seafood is, in general terms, regulated in ways that seeks to limit its environmental impacts at the point of production and to ensure a stable and sustainable fishing industry. This is not to say various international mechanisms have been successful in meeting this aim. But social protection is at least one of the stated aims of such regulatory policies. International fishing limits, such as those imposed by the European Union are aimed at precisely this form of control (Pearse and Walters, 1992) .
The closure of the fishing grounds by the Spanish government following the Prestige disaster was done ostensibly to protect human health, but also to enable fish stocks to recover and be replenished. As we have seen, one of the effects of this ultimately was to create a new set of risks to the safety of workers in UK shellfish production.
In times of shortage or environmental disaster, production controls on cockle picking in Morecambe Bay are similarly imposed by a statutory government agency. The regulator currently empowered to do this notes that its formal aim in law is to secure "the right balance between social, environmental and economic benefits to ensure healthy seas, sustainable fisheries and a viable industry."
2 At the time of the Morecambe Bay disaster, stocks were healthy, and therefore did not require such controls.
Labour conditions in the production of seafood in the UK are the responsibility of a range of agencies. Foremost amongst those is the Health and Safety Executive, responsible for enforcing safety standards that are designed to protect workers across the seafood production sites that are the concern of this paper. In practice, however, in the context of the regulation of the undocumented labour market that the Morecambe Bay cockle pickers were part of, the regulatory authorities have neither the resources nor the political will to inspect and investigate unregistered enterprises and seek compliance or take enforcement action in this sector. In any case workplace safety regulators are operating in an environment that is dominated by immigration control. In the months and weeks leading up to disaster, cocklers on Morecambe might have had a chance of seeing immigration officers, but would have had little chance of seeing workplace safety regulators (for example, The Daily Mail, 23rd August, 2003) .
Certainly the level of state effort directed at controlling 'illegal' workers dwarfs the state effort that seeks to ameliorate the conditions that enable migrant workers to be exploited (Burnett and Whyte, 2010) .
Indeed, it is in this context that we must understand the prosecution of the Chinese Fishing company that bought the cockles from Lin to sell on to larger producers were cleared of facilitating the crime. All of the larger market players: the canning factories, the exporters and the corporations marketing and selling the cockles were sufficiently distanced by the supply chain to prevent them from even being questioned in public discussion about their role in the deaths of the 24 workers. The role of those players is discussed briefly in the section that follows.
Seafood Distribution
Responsibility for seafood distribution is similarly spread across a complex chain of different entities. A large part of the global demand for shellfish is driven by Spanish consumers. Indeed, the Spanish market is certainly the most important market for cockles in Europe, buying most of its cockles from European countries. This market had previously been supplied mainly from Galicia (Pawiro, 2010) . Recognising the opportunities in Britain, some of the Spanish companies moved in to buy cockles from producers they have not dealt with before. One indication of this entry into the market by big Spanish players illustrated when in 2002 the Spanish company Conservas Dani bought a family-run firm based in Wales which had previously preferred to deal with established cocklers (Herbert and Nash, 2004) . The net effect of the entry into the market of the large Spanish market players was therefore that pre-existing supply chains were re-configured.
The intensification of market conditions had some very direct impacts on labour
conditions. An ongoing dispute between British and Chinese gangs of cocklers intensified during the months and weeks leading up to the disaster. The dispute was partly about the territorial rights to work the Bay, but was also fuelled by the assumption that Chinese labourers were gaining a competitive advantage because they were more likely to take risks than locally established cocklers. In the week before the disaster, buyers were being asked by British cocklers not to purchase cockles harvested by Chinese gangs (ibid.). However, the reconfiguration of trading relationships in the industry most probably made it easier for new sellers of British-harvested cockles to 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 enter the market. Indeed, it was reported in court that the Liverpool Bay Fishing
Company who would were buying the cockles from the direct employer of the 24 workers were selling to the large Spanish market players (Daily Post, 20 th September 2005) . If the shift in conditions of the normal sites of shellfish production in Europe intensified demand for production in Britain, the restructuring of ownership patterns in the industry thus led to the repositioning of trading relationships in the industry. Those changes in economic relationships combined to create new opportunities for gangmasters employing Chinese workers to enter those markets.
In the aftermath of Morecambe Bay, none of the key players in the labour market described above were even questioned, never mind investigated for their role in creating the conditions of the crime. In many ways this is a very obvious point, for the structure of regulation in both the seafood and labour markets, and the regulatory regimes that governed those markets, enable the most powerful players to remain distant from the conditions of exploitation that they benefit from. In this context it almost seems ludicrous to question why they were not prosecuted. How could the most powerful players -the buyers of the cockles that existed several stages removed along the supply chain -possible be questioned when the likely destination of the cockles -and the source of the demand -was masked by a complex supply chain?
The production and distribution of oil and seafood, though organised in different geographical and regulatory spaces are organised using the same principles. There is a similar principle of outsourcing and fragmented structure of ownership across production and distribution in those industries. It is this organised fragmentation that guarantees a number of crucial outcomes: cost reduction, labour casualization and 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 ultimately distancing the most powerful players from the entry-end of the supply chain.
A complex regime of permission thus provides the foundations for capital accumulation before it establishes regulatory protections for the environment or workers.
Conclusion
Systematically drawing the connections across two connected 'events' reinforces the problems we face in focussing on immediately perceived criminal practices. The response of the Spanish state to the disaster indicates the complexity of tracing any common goal here. After all, the Spanish government clearly attributed the problem of regulation to the US state, as is indicated by its attempt to sue ABS. This complexity is also illustrated also by the immediate response of the Spanish government in the ordering of the vessel to be towed out to sea away from Spanish waters, an order that was strongly resisted by the ship's owners. Again, if there is a common goal, it is not clear in relation to the immediate circumstances of the disaster, but at a very general level in the global regime of permission.
It is a process of capital accumulation that is guaranteed and under-pinned at every turn by this complex regime of permission. And this process of capital accumulation reveals much about the real structure of social relations. The workers at Morecambe Bay died   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 producing value for corporate players from a commodity that at some time in the past was a common resource. Their position was made more vulnerable by the commodified distribution of another common resource, oil.
If the social relations of expropriation and exploitation that created the Prestige and
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